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ABSTRACT
The past two decades have witnessed an increasing number of armed conflicts, both
inter- and intra-nationally, and an even more increasing number of multilateral military
interventions without UN Security Council authorization. Central to the discussion of
these interventions are the themes of humanitarianism and state sovereignty.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between humanitarian
imperatives and principles of sovereignty within the context of armed conflict to better
understand the tensions that have led to the current global outcomes. In so doing, it
identifies how humanitarian principles, imperatives, and actions have affected the
contemporary conception of state sovereignty and, subsequently, facilitated for the
circumvention of the long-standing principles of sovereign equality and freedom from
intervention. Equally as important, this thesis provides an accessible tracing of
contextualized historical events that have led to the current state of affairs.
Through a critical study of primary sources, discussions, and critiques from within the
humanitarian field, legal scholarship, and political science, the research reveals how
actors driven by moral principles of humanity have perpetuated mechanisms and
systems and facilitated the creation of doctrines and legal regimes that undermine the
notion of sovereignty. This thesis surveys the histories of specific humanitarian
organizations and regimes and places them within their relevant geopolitical contexts.
Subsequently, it pinpoints the four most pivotal moments of interaction between
humanitarianism and sovereignty, and outlines how they facilitated for the
militarization of humanitarianism, the legitimation of intervention, and the erosion of
state sovereignty.
KEY WORDS: International Law, Sovereignty, Humanitarianism, Human Rights, Humanitarian
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I. Introduction
Imagine being woken up at the break of dawn as a four-year-old by a loud boom. Imagine the
sound repeating over and over and your mother running into your room with a concerned
look on her face. That is one of the most vivid memories I have from my childhood. It was on
that day that I became aware that a part of my country, Lebanon, was occupied, and that the
occupier, Israel, uses its fighter planes to bomb areas around the country or to simply break
the sound barrier over Lebanese airspace as a tool of intimidation. On that day, I became
aware of war.
Approximately a decade later, in 2006, war made another appearance in my life. In
July 2006, Hizballah conducted an operation at the Lebanon border against an Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) patrol, capturing two personnel and sparking a war. During the war of 2006, I
witnessed firsthand the effects of war on civilian populations. I saw most of my
neighborhood razed to the ground; I saw casualties and injured persons in the streets; I was
displaced from my home; I lost several friends; and I survived a bombing by a mere few
minutes. At that time, it did not make any sense to me how Israel's destroying my country's
infrastructure; methodical and systematic targeting of roads, bridges, and tunnels; and
displacement of thousands of civilians could be a legitimate response to a relatively smallscale operation on an IDF patrol, especially since all news outlets available to me at the time
either spoke about International Humanitarian Law or carried humanitarian calls or pleas to
end the war. It did not make any logical sense to my 15-year-old brain how things so
seemingly well established as International Humanitarian Law and humanitarian
organizations could fail, and more specifically, fail me. Years passed, and the 2006 war
became a distant memory to me.
Shortly before I started my graduate studies, I took a job in the field of news media.
Most of my work assignments revolved around the ongoing conflict in Syria, which began as
a civil uprising in March 2011 and quickly escalated into a multipartite armed conflict. As my
work covered more and more reports about the ever-complicating situation in Syria, civilian
casualties, the use of internationally prohibited weapons, the displacement of millions, and
the military involvement of several countries and entities, the question of legitimacy that I
had in 2006, especially in light of the similar humanitarian calls and pleas, resurfaced and
began to nag at me again. Hence, armed conflict seemed like the most logical jump off point
for my graduate thesis. However, as many international law students, scholars, and
practitioners can attest, things are never as straightforward as they seem. As I began my
1

research into the laws of armed conflict, I was confronted by a plethora of binaries, nuances,
and thresholds to consider, far more than can be sufficiently handled in a graduate thesis, so I
decided to pursue the law. However, the law did not lend itself any easier to understanding;
the status of the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, for
example, remains in question. The law led me to the topic of the classification of armed
conflict as a central issue in determining the relevance and applicability of the law. The
different considerations, criteria, and rules that regulate international and non-international
armed conflict and their nuances made that endeavor even less realistic than the one before.
However, as I researched further, I found that regardless of the classification of the armed
conflict, there seemed to be a binary that applied across the board, that of proportionality and
necessity. This binary led me down a research tangent that revolved around the tension
between state and the individual and, ultimately, to the tension between sovereignty and
humanitarianism. I chose humanitarianism. More specifically, I wanted to answer the
question of how has the intercourse among humanitarianism, international law, and principles
relating to sovereignty contributed to the erosion of the latter? Put simply in one anticlimactic word, the answer is: incrementally.
The first obstacle in tackling topics relating to humanitarianism is the game of
definitions. This is the case because humanitarianism is a disambiguation, and there are
perhaps as many varied humanitarianisms as there are humans. Hence, attempting to define it
in this thesis, ontologically, would be as effective as emptying out the ocean using a sieve.
For the purposes of clarity, and, equally as important, brevity, this thesis will adopt the
definition that humanitarianism is what humanitarians do. But given the wide array of
humanitarianisms, it follows that there is as wide an array of humanitarians. What do they
humanitarians aspire to do? Some humanitarians work to provide aid and relief to persons
affected by natural disasters or armed conflict, while others are more concerned with
transforming "the structural conditions that endanger populations." They achieve this goal by
working on "development, democracy promotion, establishing the rule of law and respect for
human rights, and post-conflict peace building."1 Additionally, as Michael Barnett and
Thomas G. Weiss note
For many in the contemporary age, to be a humanitarian is to respond to the suffering of others
regardless of their identity, to act selflessly, to do what can be done to save lives, and to place humanity
1
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above all other considerations. Stated differently, it rebels against a world that typically orbits around
interest, politics, and power and communicates through violence, destruction, and bloodshed."2

A search for commonalities among the different strands of humanitarianism and types of
humanitarians can lend a helping hand in deducing a definition or, more accurately, a
description of who humanitarians are. As such, surmised from the descriptions above,
humanitarians can be described as principled actors drawing on existing moral and normative
discourses to affect a change in the status quo. Their moral duty to act, as will be discussed in
the following chapters, originates from their "humanity" and their cosmopolitan belief that
"each person is of equal moral worth and a subject of moral concern." 3 This description of
the humanitarian, then, proposes four specific points of consideration and discussion: a status
quo, principled actors, discourse, and a change.4 Although this definition and these points of
discussion can still encompass a wide range of humanitarianisms and humanitarians, this
thesis is only concerned with humanitarians responding to armed conflict or organized
violence and calling for international action.
Even within these definitional parameters of humanitarianism, this study, of course, is
not without limitations. Firstly, this thesis cannot, nor does it claim to, offer any insight about
the psychology of humanitarianism and/or the humanitarian actor, where moral and
humanitarian principles stem from, or where the impulse for action originates; Secondly, this
thesis cannot provide a solution or a better alternative to address mass atrocities from a
humanitarian standpoint; Thirdly, due to time and pragmatic considerations, this thesis does
not and cannot account for all the systems of compliance created under and stemming from
similar notions of humanitarianism; and finally, it cannot thoroughly examine all instances in
which humanitarian claims have undermined state sovereignty; more specifically the
principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention.
Within the previous definition of humanitarianism, and aware of its limitations, this
thesis will provide a brief account of how the seemingly innocuous notion of
humanitarianism came to undermine the longstanding principles relating to state sovereignty;
namely sovereign equality and freedom from intervention. To do so, it will identify and focus
on four specific "moments" in history in which humanitarianism and sovereignty have

2
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Id at 12 and 43.
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This thesis will use the word change for its dictionary definition of causing something to be different. It does
not intend to imply or make any references to theories of change or progress in international law.
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interacted in the manner mentioned above.5 It will provide a short survey of how the
champions of these four moments talk about them, supplement those narratives through a
more discerning and contextual revision, examine the principles and discourses at play in
each of those moments, and finally, assess the impact that they have had on state sovereignty
in international law. The four moments of concern for this thesis are: The founding of the
ICRC, the human rights movement and the founding of Amnesty International and Medicins
Sans Frontieres, post-Cold War security and development, and the post-September 11 War on
Terror. Though not exhaustive, these moments, as will be demonstrated in the following
chapters, were selected because they are illustrative. They are clearcut examples of how
moral humanitarian principles and claims, through their interaction with international law and
foreign policy, came to undermine state sovereignty. The four moments came about in
opportune times as global politics were experiencing a paradigm shift and international
morality was changing. The four moments were triggered by events seemingly acceptable in
the past but no longer in congruence with the tastes of the time. As a result, these four
moments contributed to the creation of new doctrines, practices, and regimes that have had an
immense impact on global politics, international relations, and international law.
Chapter I, Civilizing War and the Founding of the ICRC, will discuss the founding of
the International Committee of the Red Cross as the first international humanitarian
organization concerned with the provision of aid and relief in armed conflict and as the
cornerstone for the formalization and codification of the laws of war. Chapter II, Humanizing
War and the Humanitarian NGO, will discuss how the precedence set by the creation of an
international humanitarian organization allowed for the marriage of the language of
humanitarianism and human rights and the creation of a rights-based humanitarianism.
Chapter III, Militarizing Humanitarianism, will discuss how human rights instruments as
vocabulary contributed to the redefinition of state sovereignty as a result of the notions of
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. Finally, Chapter IV,
Democratizing States and Liberating Humans, will discuss how the foreign policies and

5
For a more in depth analysis or critique of humanitarianism and humanitarian imperatives see Antonio Donini,
The far side: the meta functions of humanitarianism in a globalised world, 34 DISASTERS S220–S237 (2010); S.
Neil MacFarlane & Thomas Weiss, Political interest and humanitarian action, 10 SECURITY STUDIES 112–142
(2000); Thomas G. Weiss, The Politics of Humanitarian Ideas, 31 SAGE PUBLICATIONS, LTD. 11–23 (2000);
Antonio Donini, Through a Glass, Darkly: Empire and Humanitarianism, in CAPITALIZING ON CATASTROPHE :
NEOLIBERAL STRATEGIES IN DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION 29–44 (Nandini Gunewardena & Mark Schuller eds.,
c2008); and Roberto Belloni, The trouble with humanitarianism, 33 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 451–
474 (2007).
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military interventions by the United States and its allies in the aftermath of 11 September
2001 put the final nail in the coffin of state sovereignty and non-intervention.

5

II. Civilizing War and the Founding of the Red Cross
A. Overview
The first moment in this study of the interaction of humanitarianism and sovereignty is
represented, for the purposes of this thesis, by the creation of the Red Cross. The state of
affairs before the creation of the Red Cross saw the sovereign as absolute in power and in
freedom of conduct. Furthermore, morally, Europe was experiencing a paradigm shift as a
result of the Enlightenment and the notions of civility. The event, represented by the creation
of the Red Cross, is said to have bring triggered by the experience of Henri Dunant of the
Battle of Solferino. Through the medium of his book, Dunant reported on scenes of pain and
suffering that were inaccessible before to the European elite. Coupling his appeal to his
audience’s pathos with rhetoric of Christianity and civility Dunant called on European
governments to restrict their own conduct vis-à-vis enemy combatants at war. As a result, the
Red Cross was founded, the Laws of War were codified, and new rules of customary
international law were created. Another effect, essential for the purposes of this study, was
the creation of the first international humanitarian non-governmental organization with a
mandate to affect state conduct and international legislation. This is as will be demonstrated
throughout this thesis the first step toward undermining the principles of state sovereignty,
namely sovereign equality and non-intervention. It set the precedent for moral actors to
intervene in the affairs of the sovereign, though with consent, and staked the claim for
humanizing armed conflict.
B. Christianity, Civility, and Henri Dunant:
Humanitarianism as it is seen and understood today owes a great deal of its existence to Henri
Dunant and the founding of the Red Cross, which later became what is now known as the
International Committee of the Red Cross. This moment in the history of humanitarianism
formalized the conduct of war, institutionalized humanitarian action, and set the foundations
for its guiding principles. The majority of literature on humanitarianism and its development
claims that for centuries before the founding of the Red Cross, which later became what is
now known as the ICRC, religious guidelines, historical traditions, and bilateral treaties
shaped the way in which wars were waged, discriminated between "civilized" and "barbaric"
behavior, and prescribed the victors' treatment of the defeated.6 But Henry Dunant's
experience of the battle of Solferino came to change that. Dunant's humanitarian activism

6
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ultimately led to the founding of the ICRC and the adoption of the first Geneva Convention,
which became the foundation for what later came to be known as the law of war.7
According to the ICRC,
What was to become the International Committee of the Red Cross met for the first time in February
1863 in Geneva, Switzerland. Among its five members was a local man named Henry Dunant who, the
year before, had published a book (A Souvenir of Solferino) calling for improved care for wounded
soldiers in wartime."8

And by the end of 1863, "the committee had brought together government representatives to
agree on Dunant's proposal for national relief societies, to help military medical services."
Shortly thereafter, the represented governments adopted the first Geneva Convention, which "
obliged armies to care for wounded soldiers, whatever side they were on, and introduced a
unified emblem for the medical services: a red cross on a white background."9
As the ICRC notes, although its role was to coordinate among the state parties at first,
"it gradually became more involved in field operations, as the need for a neutral intermediary
between belligerents became apparent." To ensure its neutrality, the ICRC developed seven
fundamental principles to provide the "ethical, operational and institutional framework" for
its work; humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and
universality. This, in brief, is how the ICRC tells the story of its founding. Whether by design
or not, this narrative provides very little context and background information about one of the
major characters, Henry Dunant. It simply mentions his authoring of a book. However, as
demonstrated below, having a better understanding of Henry Dunant's character and position
reveals the ICRC and its humanitarian project in a different light.
Although the ICRC's self-described history mentions Henry Dunant and his book, it sheds
very little light on the status quo before its founding and omits very significant information
about Dunant's character; two very important factors for this study. Fortunately, other
detailed accounts fill in the gaps and provide the required context for identifying the status
quo, principles, and change that motivated Dunant's intervention. Dunant was a principled
actor who drew on the preexisting discourses of Christianity, civility, and cosmopolitanism to
affect the change of the status quo of the conduct of war.
Notwithstanding the fact that the criteria for who qualified as a human at the time of
Dunant's intervention might have been very different to those of the modern era, the research
7

For an elaboration on the relationship between law and war see generally DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW
(2006).
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ICRC, History of the ICRC (Oct. 31, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/history-icrc .
Id.
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shows that Dunant's moral sensibilities, based in Christian principles, were the driving force
behind his intervention. His book, A Memory of Solferino, capitalized on the horrific
imageries of war while utilizing the discourse and vernacular of Christianity and civilization
to compel the Christian European states into compromising a portion of their sovereign
prerogatives in the conduct of war.
In 1859, Henry Dunant, "a devotee of Christian pietist philanthropy" and "enthusiastic
volunteer" who as a youth "joined a charitable society whose members visited and gave small
allowances to the city's [Geneva's] poor and sick and distributed moral tracts to prisoners,"10
witnessed the battle of Solferino between French and Austro-Hungarian troops. In Solferino,
Dunant witnessed the impact of war on soldiers as well as civilians. Having seen the suffering
of the wounded troops from both armies who had been brought to "an improvised field
hospital" in a church, he took it upon himself to do "what he could to relieve their misery."11
Believing that he was "an instrument of God,"12 Dunant set out to share his account of the
Battle of Solferino, and subsequently wrote A Memory of Solferino.13
Dunant's memoire was peppered with stories of military courage and accounts of
valiant "wellborn[s]"14 who were wounded in the battle, but most importantly, although it
provided a narrative different to that which was popular in Europe, his account of suffering
caused by war "reflected the views of the nineteenth-century bourgoise." Dunant's experience
of the battlefield incited his "romantic imagination"15 as he wrote detailed accounts of
suffering. His memoire provided a factual account that countered the tales of victory and
glory and boiled war down to soldiers being "sacrificed and then abandoned to suffer until
they died."16 As Barnett notes, "whole passages described churches that are turned into
hospitals or morgues and hallways that become assembly lines for amputations performed
without anesthesia."17 Most importantly, however, was that in his memoire, Dunant
emphasized the notions or humanity and fraternity that were spread among those tending for
the wounded. In one of the most sensationalist passages of his book, he recalls that the
women of Castiglione:

10

JOHN F. HUTCHINSON, CHAMPIONS OF CHARITY: WAR AND THE RISE OF THE RED CROSS 57-59 (1996).
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Supra note 6 at 60.
Id at 57, 76-79.
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See generally Supra note 10, Chapter 4. Also see HENRY DUNANT, HENRY DUNANT & HENRY DUNANT, A
MEMORY OF SOLFERINO (Repr ed. 1986).
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Id at 62.
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Seeing that I made no distinction between nationalities, followed my example, showing the same
kindness to all these men whose origins were so different, and all of whom were foreigners to them
'Tutti fratelli' [all are brothers] they repeated feelingly. All honor to these compassionate women, to
these girls of Castiglione! Imperturbable, unwearying, unfaltering, their quiet self-sacrifice made little
of fatigue and horrors and of their own devotion.18

Dunant's memoire was not intended as a mere account of the horrors of war and the suffering
that it brings on soldiers and civilians all the same, it was intended as a call for action, a call
for all humankind to follow in the footsteps of himself and the women of Castiglione, and
hence, he proposed the formation of "relief societies" in time of "peace and quiet" so that the
necessary and appropriate care could be given to those wounded in time of war. Dunant saw
wars as unavoidable, and thus, those relief societies were his pragmatic solution to what he
perceived to be a persisting problem.19
As Barnett notes, Dunant was not the first to sound the horn for regulating war and
providing relief, However, his call met with the response that it did because it delivered "the
right message at the right time."20 Barnett explains that
the first push for to regulate war began in the seventeenth century and was the product of advances in
military technology that made war more brutal; moral and legal discourse regarding civilized behavior
(among Christians); and arguments in favor of international norms to create a stable and just order
among (European) states.21

Dunant's calls piqued the interest of the Genevan Society of Public Utility, which in
February1863 established an exploratory committee comprising Dunant and four other deeply
religious Genevan citizens, one of whom was Gustave Moynier. Moynier was a Calvinist
who "believed that the Calvinist elite had a special role to play in the world" and who was
driven by the possibility of charitable organizations stimulating Christian notions and
civilizing the lower class.22 While the five Genevans were driven by their Christian morality,
they had to confront the fact that they could achieve nothing without the blessing of states.
Exercising their right to sovereignty, states were at first weary of Dunant's propositions but
later yielded when they realized that this project can be used to legitimize war.23
Subsequently, governments met to discuss Dunant's proposals. However, many of the
proposals were rejected by military leaders on the basis that civilian involvement in warzones
might undermine military operations and the war effort. As such, only one of Dunant's
18

Id at 68.
Id at 70.
20
Id at 78.
21
Id.
22
Id at 79.
23
Id.
19
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proposals passed unchanged, which was the creation of "an international convention that
grants special protection to the wounded and those caring for them, regardless of whether
they were uniformed or civilian," the first Geneva Convention of 1864.24
The Convention provided that states could voluntarily establish national Red Cross societies
that were distinguished by a Swiss emblem, the red cross. As is the case with all international
conventions and treaties, state participation in the first Geneva Convention was voluntary and
only motivated by state interest.25 Within this narrow scope of application, what is now
known as international humanitarian law started, and the ICRC was founded to help develop,
protect, and shape it.
The Geneva Convention and the creation of the ICRC were a monumental milestone
in the history of humanitarianism in warfare. The former regulated the conduct of warfare
and the latter monitored it and aided in ensuring that troops were afforded with the
humanitarian treatment that the Conventions guaranteed them.26 Despite the significance of
the formation of the ICRC, its relationship to states has, since its inception, been a
complicated one. It was concerned with one of the state's most important functions and
jurisdictions, security; It was not a state institution, but it required the compliance and
endorsement of states to achieve its objectives. Therefore, the ICRC strove to establish itself
as an entity independent from the state through principles and symbolisms.27 However, as
was the trend at the time, with the militarization of society, the Red Cross societies were
pulled into the state;
States increasingly treated national Red Cross societies as part of the war effort, and the Red Cross
societies, desirous of being accepted by their governments, accommodated. Far from articulating and
aspiring to cosmopolitanism, they developed a patriotic nationalism as they reminded citizens of their
duty to help their soldiers at the front. Red Cross societies begin providing support to the troops,
running blood drives, delivering food to soldiers going off to war, staffing recovery hospitals, and
encouraging citizens to donate to the war effort.28

While the ICRC was heavily influenced by nationalist and patriotic discourse within Europe,
its outlook toward the non-European world was heavily influenced by what it had assumed to
be exclusively Christian and civilized values.29 Therefore, while it was optimistic about
European societies' being accepting of its charitable mission, the ICRC was surprised that the
24

Id. at 80
Id. Barnett explains that reciprocity among states was a main motivator for their adopting the Geneva
Convention and endorsing the involvement of the Red Cross in the war effort.
26
Id.
27
Id at 81.
28
Id.
29
Id.
25
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Muslim Ottoman Sultan would accept the Geneva Conventions under the stipulation of
adopting the red crescent in the stead of the red cross.30 After granting the Ottoman Sultan his
request, the ICRC began rethinking its mission outside of Europe, expanding and establishing
Red Cross societies around the world. The ICRC hoped that its growing popularity will aid it
in "universalizing the laws of war and diffusing Christian notions of charity," which Moynier
had hoped "would 'humanize' the 'savage peoples' by rescuing them from their 'brute
instincts.'"31
This historical account as given makes it clear that the birth of what is now known as
modern humanitarianism, international humanitarian law, and the ICRC -- the organization
that is at the vanguard of Dunantist humanitarian action -- came about in a very specific
historic, political, and social context that is far removed from the idealistic and
romanticized,32 and framed narrative that the ICRC employs in its public relations. Dunantist
humanitarianism and its first sanctioned institution were created by a European Christian
bourgeoise that saw in the "humanization" of war an opportunity to bring Christian values to
the common people of Europe and to civilize those outside it. The project was further
advanced with the consent of the sovereign states that also saw an opportunity in this
development to legitimize their wars and supplement the war effort. Most importantly, the
founding of the ICRC set the precedent for allowing civilian actors to intervene in the affairs
of the state, though with its consent, in matters relating to war. Furthermore, this first act of
institutionalization and formalization set the stage for the remaining three moments to be
discussed in the chapters to follow.
C. Setting Principles of Humanitarian Action:
Having a longstanding tradition of humanitarian work and being accepted by states as a
neutral actor, the ICRC became a beacon for humanitarianism. As such, its capacity expanded
to include the codification of international humanitarian law and acting in its capacity, be it
advisory or as a specialist. Vital to its popularity, acceptance, and authority was the ICRC’s
ability to adapt from its originally Christian values to more secular and humanitarian ones,
and to separate its work from politics. Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the ICRC, in his
speech to the UN General Assembly in November 1992, made this clear: ‘humanitarian

30

Id at 82
Id. The account above highlights several problematic aspects in the conception of modern humanitarianism
and points to the stark differences between the narrative provided by the ICRC itself and that provided by
outsiders researching its history. Although that is not the crux of this thesis, I would be remiss not to mention it.

31
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endeavour and political action must go their separate ways if the neutrality and impartiality of
humanitarian work are not to be jeopardized. 33 As a result, until the late 1990s it enjoyed the
exclusive reign over defining what qualified as humanitarian action. To do so, the ICRC had
to found its work in humanitarian principles that define and guide its work. The seven
fundamental principles of the ICRC’s work are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality,
independence, voluntary service, unity, universality. 34 However, only four of these principles
became the core of all humanitarian action that followed; humanity, impartiality, neutrality,
and universality. The four principles are reflected in the work of later established institutions
such as the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA 1943-47), the UN
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF 1946), and the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR 1950).35
The ICRC describes the principle of humanity as being,
born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield,
endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering
wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human
being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all
peoples[;]

The principle of impartiality as its making
no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to
relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most
urgent cases of distress[;]

The principle of neutrality as “not tak[ing] sides in hostilities or engag[ing] at any time in
controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature[;]” and the principle of
universality as stemming from its being a movement “in which all Societies have equal status
and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.”36 These
principles, at least in form if not content, are also reflected in the work of other humanitarian
NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontieres.
The ICRC, viewed uncritically and outside the context of its founding, is a seemingly
logical candidate for praise and admiration for its humanitarian work. However, its founding
and founding principles based in the same religious morality that aided in bringing about
33
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colonialism, as demonstrated above, set the stage for the erosion of state sovereignty. The
seemingly innocuous inception of the ICRC gave birth to the institution of the humanitarian
non-govermental organization and formalized the intervention into the domain of the
sovereign. Try as it may to reshape and represent itself as a secular organization, by
sanitizing and attempting to secularize its guiding principles, the ICRC formalized them. In
so doing, the ICRC created the first legal "humanitarian" regime in which actors other than
the sovereign state can intervene in and during armed conflict. As the next chapter will
demonstrate, the redefinition of humanitarian principles by other actors represents the second
moment in this study on the road to the erosion of state sovereignty.

13

III. Humanizing War and the Humanitarian NGO
A. Overview
The second moment in this study is represented by the founding of Medecins Sans Frontieres.
However, the infrastructure for that moment was laid earlier by champions of the human
rights project. In the wake of decolonization and in a rush toward self-determination, new
states championed the human rights project as part of the argument that self-determination
was a human right. Furthermore, with the growing credibility and attractiveness of the human
rights vernacular, the founding of Amnesty International as the human rights watchdog and
primary critic of governments for human rights abuses set the precedence for openly
criticizing sovereign states for what used to be considered within their domestic purview.
This elevation of human rights on the international moral agenda led to the schism among
Red Cross humanitarians and the cognitive dissonance that resulted in the creation of MSF.
The trigger event, similar to Dunant’s Solferino, for MSF was the Biafran War. Appalled by
results of coordinating with an oppressive government to provide aid to civilians in need of
relief saw a group of Red Cross humanitarians making the deviation from the principles of
the Red Cross and choosing advocacy for victims over the provision of emergency aid. In so
doing, the MSF marked the clear paradigm shift where rights trumped needs and the
prevailing humanitarianism was more concerned with notions of development and good
governance than with solutions to immediate problems. In short, this second moment
highlights the point in history where human rights preceded humanitarian needs in the
economy of international morality.
B. Liberalism, Human Rights, Amnesty International
After World War II, the relatively longstanding tradition of Dunantist humanitarianism since
the founding of the Red Cross in 1864, dominated the humanitarian field. However, with the
conception of liberal projects, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, a new
type of principled actor and humanitarian emerged. This event was born out of a
disenchantment with the ICRC model which approached the sovereign with deference, to the
detriment of aid and relief provision at times. Credited with pioneering this new strand,
Médecins Sans Frontiere introduced what some researchers and scholars have termed as
solidarist humanitarianism; humanitarianism in solidarity with those whom the humanitarian
aims to serve. However, any discussion of the history and/or impact of the founding of MSF
would be lacking without first the mention of the first international human rights nongovernmental organization in 1961, Amnesty International.
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Shortly before the end of World War II, Western states started working actively to shape
international law in preparation for the end of the war. As Samuel Moyne notes
There were both British and American projects, beginning around 1941, to outline the future
importance and shape of international law, which would need to be revised in order to play any role
once peace came around. One American revived an already forgotten interwar proposal for an
international declaration of rights[,]

And after the end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations, this proposed
bill of rights saw the light. It is what we now know as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR). Presented as the culmination of state consensus because it was endorsed by
both the Western and Eastern Blocs, the UDHR created a seemingly unproblematic set of
vocabulary of rights owed to all of humanity.
During the Cold War and in the wake of decolonization, the world witnessed a
barrage of new intra-national conflicts and civil strife. Rather than the earlier distinction
between civilized and uncivilized states, a new binary emerged: the liberal and the non-liberal
state.37 Relying on the democratic peace theory, a new brand of humanitarianism led by
Western liberal states, emerged and did not suffice with providing aid and relief to victims of
humanitarian crises, rather it wanted to address their root causes.38 To the adherents of this
new strand of humanitarianism the root causes of the suffering that they aimed to alleviate
were seen as the sovereign state’s failure or inability to provide their citizens with the rights
they were owed.
Armed with the belief that it was "possible and desirable to transform political,
economic, and cultural structures so that they liberated individuals and produced peace and
progress,"39 this new humanitarianism made social change its goal and found in the human
rights movement the means to do so. The language of this humanitarianism spread throughout
liberal societies, and as a result
In 1961, British lawyer Peter Benenson was outraged when two Portuguese students were jailed just for
raising a toast to freedom. He wrote an article in The Observer newspaper and launched a campaign
that provoked an incredible response. Reprinted in newspapers across the world, his call to action
sparked the idea that people everywhere can unite in solidarity for justice and freedom.40
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Benenson's letter and the response it received gave birth to Amnesty International and what
the latter describes as an "extraordinary social change." Since its founding, "Amnesty has
grown from seeking the release of political prisoners to upholding the whole spectrum of
human rights." Working in solidarity with "anyone and everyone whose freedom and dignity
are under threat," Amnesty claims that its work "protects and empowers people - from
abolishing the death penalty to protecting sexual and reproductive rights, and from
combatting discrimination to defending refugees and migrants’ rights."41
This genesis narrative has been repeated in one form or another in many historical
accounts of the organization.42 However, not many of these accounts investigate this narrative
or test how it holds up against the facts. More importantly, this narrative fails to place the
birth of Amnesty International within its historical context and shed light on Benenson’s
character and the principles that guided his humanitarianism.
C. Human Rights, Benenson, and the Founding of Amnesty International
Although the claim that Peter Benenson wrote his appeal "The Forgotten Prisoners" in the
Observer on 28 May 1961 is true, Amnesty International was conceived and its work started
earlier. In his thoroughly investigative account and archival research, Tom Buchanan sheds a
very much needed light on the early history of Amnesty International and its founder.43
Born in 1921, Benenson had a mother of Russian Jewish origins and a father who was
a former British military officer. He received his education and elite schools that afforded
him a certain level of connection to his country's ruling elites, such as Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan, for example. Before World War II broke out, Benenson took an interest in the
Spanish Civil War and founded a relief committee. During the Second World War, he
rescued Jewish children from Nazi Germany before joining the army, serving in military
intelligence, studying law, then becoming a barrister.44
Buchanan notes that "in the late 1950s there was an increasing interest on the British
Left in the question of political imprisonment, especially under right-wing regimes in Spain,
41
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Portugal, and Greece." Hence, as a member of the Labor Party, Benenson was a major player
in the founding of Spanish Democrats' Defence Fund Committee, which sought free trials for
opponents of the regime of Francisco Franco and provide their dependents with relief.45 This
leftist interest in political imprisonment was a political tactic aimed at embarrassing
"otherwise powerful repressive regimes" that were "seeking to be identified with the West."46
Moreover, this support bolstered the will of the internal opposition in countries such as Spain
and allowed for the creation of "international solidarity in the western democracies."47
However, Benenson was displeased with these efforts due to their being polarized as a result
of the Cold War. In addition, although the United Nations had created the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the vocabulary of human rights at the time was not yet
pervasive. 48 Hence, the founding of Amnesty International came within the specific context
of the Cold War, the increasing numbers of political prisoners in Eastern Bloc countries, and
a non-existent human rights regime.
Most importantly, as Buchanan notes, very specific and fundamental changes in
Benenson's professional and personal life were major influencers on the creation of Amnesty
International. In 1960, two years after converting to Catholicism, Benenson moved to Italy to
convalesce following his diagnosis with coeliac disease. His newfound religious devotion and
time for reflection were major contributors to how he viewed the world and his role in it. In
one of his correspondences, he wrote
[T]he quest for an outward and visible Kingdom [of God] is mistaken. . . . The attempt to construct a
just society by altering the external framework is, I am sure, doomed to failure. Look on the Socialist
Parties the world over, ye mighty, and despair. When each citizen is individually on the road to the
Kingdom, then I believe that there will be a just society on earth without need for the intervention of
Parliament. And if only a few of our leading citizens trod that path, then I believe that we would be
nearer the goal than if 51% of electors voted for laws designed to promote social justice.49

This religious devotion and want to create a "movement for spiritual transformation" drove
Benenson's desire to create AI. In November 1960, having returned to London, Benenson set
out to manifest the ideas and thoughts he had conceived while in Italy and to determine the
form of his movement by discussing it with his friends and acquaintances. Having established
contact with the Observer, Benenson wrote to his friend and "collaborator" Eric Baker to tell
him of his plan. He wrote
45
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I am working on a scheme to make this year (the anniversary of US Civil War & Emancipation of Serfs
in Russia) an occasion for launching a general appeal for an Amnesty for all political prisoners
everywhere. The appeal will be made on 11th November to link up with the idea of the Armistice. The
Observer is offering its centre supplement on 12th November for the occasion, & I am finding a great
deal of goodwill everywhere for the scheme. If you know of any people willing to undertake a little
work on their own in this connection, I wd. [sic] be grateful. I am compiling a list of all pol. [sic]
prisoners in each country for publication on Amnesty Day, and am looking for people who would
undertake the responsibility of getting as much information about one or more countries, thus dividing
the labour into compartments.50

Among Benenson's friends and acquaintances was the Observer's David Astor, who "had a
particular interest in civil liberties in former British colonies," and most importantly, Peter
Archer who later became the British Solicitor-General. It was Archer's suggestion that
Benenson's movement and campaign reach their conclusion on 10 December, the anniversary
of the UDHR, hence establishing the first explicit connection to human rights.51 Originally,
Benenson was keen on armistice as the title of his movement. After all, he was "calling for an
armistice in the Cold War -- a unique worldwide opening of the prison doors for those jailed
for their beliefs." However, not to antagonize the British Legion, the name armistice was
dropped, and Amnesty was chosen instead.52 The secret behind Amnesty’s success was not
just that it emerged at an opportune time. Rather, it was calculated and designed as a
campaign that can cultivate mass support. Amnesty staffers noted Peter Benenson's
"remarkable charisma and energy in the initial phase of Amnesty's work;" he "could never
stop making the revolution."53 Benenson was successful because
while too eclectic in his thinking to be seen as a profound intellectual, his true genius lay in fashioning
memorable (often religious) symbols and images. Thus, 1961 was not any old year - it was the
anniversary of the emancipation of the serfs in Russia and the outbreak of the American Civil War. If
1861 marked the freedom of the body from bondage, 1961 would mark the freedom of the mind. For
the famous Amnesty symbol, the candle in barbed wire […] Benenson had supplied the idea of the
Chinese proverb 'Better light a candle than curse the darkness' (but also insisted on the candle as a
Catholic symbol). […] many of the eye-catching ceremonies were inspired by Benenson's ideas. For
instance, for the first Human Rights Day at St Martin-in-the-Fields, celebrities Cy Grant and Julie
Christie were tied together and their bonds burnt through by the 'Amnesty candle', lit by the resistance
heroine Odette Churchill. The candle was then burnt during a vigil, surrounded by exiled former
prisoners of con- science. Under Benenson's guidance, Amnesty consistently favoured thought-
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provoking tableaux such as this rather than the mass protests and direct action associated with
contemporary campaigns[.]54

It was not enough for Benenson to launch his publicity campaign with the Observer article.
Rather, he and Baker lobbied politicians and figures. In the letter they circulated, they
sounded the horn about the emergence of "worrying trends in world politics."55 In his
correspondence with the British Prime Minister at the time, though affirming Amnesty’s not
having any links to the government, he opined that that should not get in the way of "having
private understandings, or for its [the campaign's] ultimate objectives from being those of Her
Majesty's Governments."56 As Buchanan notes, "Benenson also acknowledged his 'friendly
contacts' with the 'Research Information Department' of the Foreign Office prior to the launch
of the appeal (presumably a reference to the Information Research Department (IRD), the
anti-communist propaganda unit set up during the early stages of the Cold War)."57
Amnesty’s campaign was based around several human rights (e.g. freedom from torture,
freedom of speech, and right to asylum), but freedom of religion was the most central to
Benenson's vision. As Buchanan remarks, "[t]his was made explicit in Persecution 1961 in
which he [Benenson] defined Amnesty as an 'international movement to guarantee the free
exchange of ideas and the free practice of religion."58 To Benenson, Amnesty represented a
new "muscular Christianity" that mobilized "lay idealism." With time, the religious rhetoric
was absorbed into "the generic concept of 'Prisoner of Conscience.'"59
In brief, the whole purpose for the founding of Amnesty is best described in
Benenson’s own words
To me the whole purpose of AMNESTY (using the movement in its broadest sense) is to re-kindle a
fire in the minds of men. It is to give to him who feels cut off from God a sense of belonging to
something much greater than himself, of being a small part of the entire human race. If, God willing,
this fire stays alight, then each one with the spark burning inside of him will use it in his own way . . .
my work consists of trying to hand on the spark in many different shapes, in altered ways, to divers
people. What they do next, they must decide themselves . . . if the spark of AMNESTY has any power,
it is to convince each of us that everything is in his power.60

Amnesty set the precedents of openly criticizing sovereign states and their governments for
violations of human rights. Furthermore, Amnesty’s work laid the foundation for the creation
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of new systems of monitoring and accounting for human rights violations, identifying states
"in violation," and bringing their actions to the attention of the general public in the form of
systematic reporting.61
D. The Human Rights NGO
The success and traction that Amnesty International gained contributed to the further
proliferation of human rights vocabulary and discourse among and within liberal states,
liberal actors, and young post-colonial states looking to emulate the West and Europe. As a
result, human rights language, and indeed human rights concerns, became more
commonplace in global politics and the relationship between the lack of human rights and
human suffering became a strong point of discussion among humanitarians.
Born out of this period in which human rights vocabulary had become common, some
members of the ICRC became disenchanted with its deferential approach to the sovereign
state. Seeing the sovereign state as the cause of human suffering and a barrier to the
enjoyment of human rights, which these humanitarians deemed as necessary, they became
critical of state conduct and vocal in their criticism. This deviation from the traditional ICRC
approach, later called témoignage, or bearing witness, resulted in the creation of a splinter
group that was spurred on by the and famine in Biafra resulting from the armed conflict
between Biafran secessionists and the Nigerian Government.62 This new faction found itself
struggling to lend credibility to the claim of neutrality and impartiality as defined by the
ICRC as its open criticism of governments and their practices and its mobilization for
humanitarian action regardless of the consent of the sovereign state was seen as political.
Consequently, MSF worked on redefining the principles of its humanitarian action
and justifying its introduction of bearing witness as apolitical, neutral, and impartial because
it was founded in a humanitarian claim. While MSF adopted three of the seven guiding
principles of the ICRC its interpretation of those principles was more complex adding onto
impartiality, independence, and neutrality, MSF instituted bearing witness and transparency
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and accountability as new guidelines for humanitarian action. Defending its working
principle of bearing witness, the MSF says
Neutrality is not synonymous with silence. Our proximity to people in distress implies a duty to
raise awareness of their plight to ultimately help improve their situation. We may seek to bring
attention to extreme need and suffering, when access to life-saving medical care is hindered, when
are teams witness extreme acts of violence, when crises are neglected, or when the provision of aid
is abused. 63

In so doing, MSF established the precedents for a rights-based humanitarian action, and
indeed a rights-based humanitarianism, that was no longer only concerned with the provision
of aid and relief to the victims of conflict but also with the behaviors of states and their
compliance with what it considered to be universal principles.
By creating the space for rights-based humanitarianism MSF allowed for a more
broad reexamination of humanitarian efforts and humanitarian principles. More importantly,
because of its focus on alleviating the root causes of human suffering in conflict. To the
rights-based humanitarian NGO the root causes of said suffering were attributed to the state’s
unwillingness or inability to provide their peoples with their human rights. As a result, some
NGOs abstained from the provision of aid on the basis that it would unfairly privilege one
party to the conflict over the other or prolong the conflict altogether. Hence,
With the new merging of politics and humanitarian action however, the provision of assistance is
restricted to countries believed to be following the correct policies. Non-conforming countries may be
excluded from development assistance. Impartiality means that humanitarian response should be
guided by need alone, and that there should be no distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ beneficiaries.
Yet by subordinating humanitarian objectives to political and strategic ones, some victims are seen as
more deserving than others, and impartiality is forgone. The principle of independence contradicts the
coherence agenda, since many humanitarian agencies remain dependent on money from donor states. A
lack of independence makes impartial action more difficult. The loss of perceived neutrality under the
coherence agenda compromises humanitarian immunity and threatens access to victims. It may
jeopardize the security and independence of aid personnel. As a consequence of the loss of perceived
neutrality, humanitarian aid personnel may be exposed to security risks and may sometimes even be
deliberately targeted because of their activities.64
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This reconceptualization of humanitarian principles further entrenched privileging rights over
needs, paving the way for a more robust advocacy and support for human rights in the form
of ethical and moral argument.
E. The Universality of Human Rights and State Sovereignty
Although the Declaration of Human Rights was qualified as universal, its final form was not
the result of automatic consensus but of extensive negotiations among the state
representatives who drafted it.65 These negotiations and the resulting formulations and
reformulations deprived the UDHR of any substantial legal value. Rather, its final
formulation, at the time, was viewed by international lawyers and jurists as a mere
declaration of norms.66 Even though human rights were included in the UN Charter, they
"were reduced to embellishment - a fact that international lawyers were well positioned to
understand."67 Article 56 of the Charter, for example, made the UN Economic and Social
Council the "steward" of the human rights mentioned in the former's preamble, but did not
assign them any legal weight. Furthermore, one of the main criticisms of the UDHR was that
it left “[T]he task of protecting the individual against the sovereign State, and the world
powers in particular, has been trustingly left with the representatives of the very powers
whose discretionary power is to be curtailed.”68 As a result, international lawyers dismissed
the UDHR as a legally empty document.69
However, the dawn of decolonization came and lent credence to not only the UDHR
but also supplementary instruments such as the ICESCR and ICCPR. This was possible due
to the United Nations’ framing self-determination as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of the
rights enshrined in those instruments. However, it was not until the 1970s that human rights
began to take on a legal status. Dissident movements within the Soviet Union and the latter’s
involvement, aided by the efforts of rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International, in Chile
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after the coup mounted by Pinochet demonstrated the possibilities that a human rights regime
could allow for.
In February 1974, the Soviet Union and its allies, which normally had little use for UN human rights
activities, brought charges against Chile before the UN Human Rights Commission for violations of the
most fundamental provisions of the international human rights instruments for the protection of the
security of the person – the prohibitions against arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and
disappearances. The charges were based largely on documentation supplied by NGOS, led by Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), which had been gathering information
about conditions in Chile since shortly after the coup.70

In its responding to the Soviet charges against Chile, the Commission set the precedent that
the UN had refused to before and demanded that a sovereign state, Chile, adjust its
behavior.71 It was only after the Soviet Union and some South American states employed the
language of human rights to combat the liberal policies of the West that the United States saw
the missed opportunity and, after the end of the Cold War, it mobilized to shape and define
the legal regimes relating to human rights and their applications.72
With the ICRC laying the foundation for an ecosystem of humanitarian and relief
organizations, the UDHR provided the vernacular necessary for the creation of the human
rights NGO. In turn, the growing influence of the human rights NGO and the converging
vocabularies led to the creation of the rights-based humanitarian organization. This move
toward a rights-based humanitarianism meant that humanitarianism was no longer
exclusively interested in providing relief to victims of armed conflict. Rather, the rights-based
organization was concerned with the conduct of states and parties to armed conflict and their
human rights records. As a result, allowing the victims of armed conflict to remain without
assistance for fear of supporting illiberal regimes became defensible, and suffering justifiable.
Additionally, the rising influence of human rights language, norms, and organizations paved
the way for the creation of legal human rights regimes that further limit the sovereign's
domestic conduct. Consequently, emboldened by the momentum that the human rights
movement gained, states incorporated the human rights vernacular into their foreign policy
arsenal and used it as an extension of their politics. As the following chapter will
demonstrate, the move toward utilizing the legal frameworks of human rights for the
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extension of politics and foreign policy created the space for the notion of militarized
humanitarian intervention.
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IV. Militarizing Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect
A. Overview
The third moment in this study takes place after the end of the Cold War. With communism
no longer in competition, the Western liberal project went into full swing. This saw the
globalization of the world economy and a focus by the United Nations and institutions on
issues relating to human rights as relating to international peace and security. Furthermore,
the genocide in Rwanda highlighted the horrific ends of armed conflict that could be reached
when international action is not taken. Hence, the trigger event for the third moment is the
conflict in Kosovo. With the results of institutional collapse and governmental failure clearly
demonstrated in Kosovo after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the atrocities that were
committed in its wake, the NATO undertook an illegal military operation under the guise of
humanitarian intervention. Without any regard for international law or international
institutions that are authorized to sanction the use of force. This marked jump from the
principles of non-intervention and the legitimate uses of force would not have been possible
had the language of human rights and humanitarianism not met with the success that they did
after the end of the second World War. This doctrine of humanitarian intervention allowed
for the militarization of humanitarian aid and gave rise to the notion of the responsibility to
protect.
B. The Cold War, The Humanitarian NGO, and Development
As demonstrated in the two previous chapters, the founding of the ICRC, Amnesty, and MSF
set the stage for post-Cold War humanitarianism; the ICRC set the precedent for the creation
of a humanitarian non-governmental organization, Amnesty brought the language of
"universal" human rights into discussion, and MSF built on that vocabulary to redefine the
principles of humanitarian action, and consequently, introduce the notion of the "subsidiarity
of sovereignty."73 This new rights-based humanitarianism was now "concerned with longterm human rights outcomes rather than short-term humanitarian necessity."74 This process of
redefinition, of course, did not happen in a political vacuum; the realpolitiks of the Cold War
largely contributed to elevating and bolstering the status of the humanitarian NGO.
The genesis of the rights-based humanitarian movement is attributed to the varied
responses of NGOs during the Biafran famine of 1968. Although famine in some instances
can be the result of natural disaster the Biafran famine was the result of armed conflict; the
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Biafran independence war against the federal government of Nigeria. The Biafran famine
exemplified the devastating effects of the stalemate caused by the politics of the Cold War.
Biafran secessionists received no political support from the West, the East, or other African
states. This was a result of all the latter’s concern over destabilization caused by redrawing
state borders.75
Central to bringing the Biafran famine to international notice was the role of news and
journalism. The general public, which concerned itself with human rights, was confronted
with images of starved children. As journalist Frederick Forsyth remarks,
Quite suddenly, we’d touched a nerve. Nobody in this country [Britain] at that time had
ever seen children looking like that. The last time the Brits had seen anything like that
must have been the Belsen pictures…People who couldn’t fathom the political
complexities of the war could easily grasp the wrong in a picture of a child dying of
starvation. 76

These horrific images led to the British government being accused of complicity in “genocide
by starvation” as a result of its support for the Nigerian leadership in the form of arms
shipments. Furthermore, they contributed to the creation of a narrative involving helpless and
innocent victims in the third world suffering the consequences of the despotism of their
governments. Working to find longer-standing solutions to the crises at hand, than emergency
relief, NGOs engaged in advocacy on behalf of the victims. This move contributed to the
erosion of the principles of Dunantist humanitarianism by placing them below the goal of
achieving human rights and fighting against third world authoritarian regimes. Longerstanding solutions according to these NGOs required longer-term involvement. Weary of
third world states and their ability to develop on their own these NGOs took it upon
themselves to do the work.
Many aid agencies became dissatisfied with the limited impact of relief aid on the plight of people in
the developing world. In order to address the problems of the developing world, the more radical
NGOs turned to development, and argued for a long-term involvement in the South rather than shortterm emergency aid. 77

The work required, according to these rights-based NGOs, involved building the capacity of
the affected communities, empowering victims, and creating a civil-society that would later
carry on the work. 78 Armed with the vocabulary of human rights, (i.e. ICESCR and ICCPR)
and their skepticism of non-Western regimes, these NGOs could not trust their governments
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to do the work necessary for their citizens’ enjoyment of their social, economic, civil, and
political rights. 79 80
Consequently, relief NGOs shifted their efforts from providing aid to providing
“means of development.”
the international NGOs developed the concepts of ‘capacity-building’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘civil
society’ as they argued the need for a long term involvement in society and a sphere of influence
independent from the developing world state.81

As a result of this move toward a focus on development, Western governments found an
opening, though narrow, for extending the reach of their foreign policies. They saw in
development a way of safeguarding their political interests and security. As U.S. President
Richard Nixon boldly stated, “the main purpose of American aid is not to help other nations
but to help ourselves.”82 Consequently,
The 1970s and 1980s saw the direct government funding of NGOs like Oxfam, Christian Aid and the
Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, the integration of international humanitarian NGOs in
international institutions and their growth in numbers and influence.83

To ensure the efficacy of their involvements, Western states encouraged rights-based
humanitarian NGOs to find and/or establish local partnerships, which allowed for the direct
funding. As a result, "[t]hese Southern ‘partners’ allowed Western donors to create parallel
structures of aid and relief distribution which further acted to undermine the already weak
and under-resourced state structures" and establish new power dynamics between Southern
states and their populations.84
Nevertheless, the changes that humanitarianism experienced in the period after World
War II had no effect on the legal regimes governing its relationship to state sovereignty. On
the contrary, despite the growing popularity of and support for human rights and rights-based
humanitarianism, in the economy of international law, sovereignty trumped humanitarian
action. This can be deduced from the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States. 85 Though not binding, the
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Resolution reflected the opinions of sovereign states regarding human rights. The omission of
human rights exceptions to the inadmissibility of intervention can only be understood as a
clear statement of the subordination of human rights to state sovereignty. The end of the Cold
War, however, ushered a period for redefining several legal regimes and relationships, most
important of which to this study is the emergence of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention.
C. Post-Cold War Humanitarianism: Human Rights, International Peace and Security,
and Humanitarian Intervention
As noted above, human rights did not hold any legal weight despite the proliferation of their
vocabulary as a result of the work of rights-based humanitarian NGOs. It was not until the era
of decolonization that human rights began to feature in international law. This was a result of
the post-colonial states’ framing of self-determination as a human right despite its being
omitted from the UDHR, and Soviet and South American efforts in using the human rights
language to combat the influence of the West, more specifically, the United States.86
Consequently, as human rights began to gain more credence on the international stage, the
United States found an opportunity to reframe its own foreign policy and shape the legal
regimes that it anticipated would follow. In addition, the explosion of new states, selfdetermination wars, and intra-state conflicts after the dissolution of the Soviet Union
compelled the United Nations, and more specifically, its Security Council to redefine threats
to international peace and security. This redefinition allowed for military intervention as
provided for under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. Furthermore, the blurring of the lines
between the law of war and human rights law resulted in the creation of what is now known
as international humanitarian law, further making the language and vocabulary, though not
synonymous, interchangeable. Most importantly, the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the
international inaction in Rwanda resulted in the U.N and international law’s having to
confront the perceived failure of the Westphalian model. State sovereignty and the principle
of non-intervention were seen as the culprits and accomplices in the horrific outcomes of both
conflicts. This is best represented in U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s speech at the turn
of the century on the subject of humanitarian intervention. From an international law
perspective, it was the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s
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work on humanitarian intervention that put the second-to-final nail in the coffin of
sovereignty.87
D. Decolonization, Self Determination, and Human Rights
The 1960s did not only witness the decolonization of states but also a “decolonization of
international law” of sorts. 88 The United Nations’ framing of self-determination as a pre
requisite to the enjoyment of human rights for the peoples of the post-colonial states fueled
the human rights’ ascension to legal applicability. However, with decolonization came a new
set of international problems. The young states did not have the systems, infrastructure, and
funding necessary to afford their citizens their full social and economic rights. This led the
United Nations to redefine threats to international peace and security as those stemming from
issues relating to “underdevelopment.” As such, the United Nations refocused its efforts on
development as a way of mitigating, and in some instances preempting, intrastate conflict.
Previously, threats to international peace and security according to the U.N. involved
conflicts between states that have international repercussions. Now, the same threats were
defined as conflicts within states and among various social and political groups. In so doing,
the U.N. brought intrastate conflict into the domain of the Security Council and closer to the
latter’s capability of authorizing the use of force under Chapter VII.
This development-focused approach, however, did not stand the test of time. In 1998
the inability of development and humanitarian agencies and NGOs to mitigate the conflict in
Kosovo left the world at a loss for what can be done within the legal and humanitarian
systems and frameworks of the time to put an end to the human suffering. This, gave birth to
a doctrine of humanitarian intervention championed by NATO as a “coalition of the willing.”
Neither NATO nor international lawyers had any illusions about the illegality of the military
interventions in Kosovo. However, by framing the issue in terms of ethical and moral
imperatives, they were able to legitimize it. 89
After the fact, the international law bar found itself faced with the task of devising a
legal regime that would prevent another Kosovo from happening. Hence, the International
Law Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention was established to examine the law
and codify a form of legal interventions in the event of the Security Council’s inability to take
or authorize action in similar crises. Finding no basis for military humanitarian intervention
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or the use of force for humanitarian ends, the Commission flipped the question on its head. It
undertook the task of redefining sovereignty as the state’s responsibility to protect. 90 In its
report, the Commission opined that in the event that the Security Council is unable to
intervene to mitigate or end intrastate conflicts the international community as a whole has a
right to react as a final resort. However, the Commission’s report did not allude to any claims
of the existence of an international customary law rule that provides for such an intervention.
We did not argue in our report that there is now a sufficiently strong basis in principle and practice to
claim the existence of a formal new principle of customary international law. But we did argue that the
‘responsibility to protect’ is an emerging international norm, or guiding principle of behavior for the
international community of states, which may well become customary international law if further
consolidated in state and intergovernmental organization practice.91

The danger in the Commission’s assertion of the existence of an international norm that
allows for the use of force in such cases was that it set the precedence for tacitly legitimizing
these interventions since norms are considered a source of international law according to the
Statue of International Court of Justice. Furthermore, although that international norms
require state practice and opinio juris to ascend to the status of customary law it is within the
prerogative of the ICJ and international tribunals to make the assertion that there exists
sufficient opinio juris and state practice for humanitarian intervention and/or the
responsibility to protect to be recognized rules of international customary law.
Such an assertion by an international court or tribunal is not unprecedented. For
example, in the aftermath of the war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, the international
tribunal for the former Yugoslavia used the same juristic maneuver to apply the rules of
international law applicable to international armed conflict to an intranational one. 92 As
Meron highlights,
Through a process of osmosis or application by analogy, the recognition as customary of norms rooted
in international human rights instruments has affected the interpretation, and eventually the status, of
the parallel norms in instruments of international humanitarian law. The influence of processes
followed in the human rights field on the development of customary law by humanitarian law tribunals
is well- known. The jurisprudence of the Hauge Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
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Tribunal for Rwanda affords a wealth of material showing how criminal tribunals applying
humanitarian law are informed by human rights law.93

Practically, the ICTY’s verdict in the Tadic case removed internal or intrastate armed conflict
from the exclusive purview of the sovereign state, protected from intervention by the
principle of state sovereignty, and internationalized it using human rights and humanitarian
principles. As such, now, states presenting themselves as champions of humanitarian and
human rights ideals can intervene in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states as long as
they can present their intervention as stemming from ethical and moral considerations rather
than political ones. One of the most important maneuvers in achieving that end is not to act
unilaterally. Rather, states can establish “coalitions of the willing” and/or utilize the systems
and mechanisms of reginal organizations to distance themselves from culpability or
accusations of using force for political ends. This, as will be demonstrated in the chapter
below paved the way for military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq after the 11
September 2001 attacks.
After the end of World War II, the notion that human rights were essential to
development, and development to international peace and security ranked human rights high
in the economy of international concerns. This led to the creation of several regimes to ensure
compliance with the liberal project, such as International Criminal Law.94 In addition, the
conflation of human rights and the humanitarian principles governing the conduct of war and
armed conflict and the seemingly interchangeable vocabulary used by human rights NGOs
allowed for both systems to merge into one; International Humanitarian Law.95 This new
project of International Humanitarian Law built on the infrastructure and credibility of
humanitarian action and the human rights movement to further encroach on the domain of the
sovereign state. Aided by court pronouncements such as that of the Tadic case and military
interventions sanctioned by the UNSC, humanitarian and human rights claims were, for all
intents and purposes, placed higher than state sovereignty in the hierarchy of international
law principles. Tipping the scales in favor of morality rather than legality created the
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necessary environment for militarizing humanitarian intervention. With human suffering
previously justified by the rhetoric of right-based humanitarianism, it allowed for illegal
interventions such as those in Kosovo and Afghanistan to be defended and legitimized on the
moral humanitarian grounds upheld by the coalitions of the willing, but more importantly, the
able.96

96

See generally Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying
Humanitarian Intervention, 6 ETHICS INT. AFF. 95–117 (1992); David S. Koller, The Faith of the International
Criminal Lawyer, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1019–1070 (2007); RONEN STEINKE, THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: GERMAN PERSPECTIVES FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE (1st ed ed.
2012); and Amir Pasic & Thomas G. Weiss, The Politics of Rescue: Yugoslavia’s Wars and the Humanitarian
Impulse, 11 ETHICS INT. AFF. 105–131 (1997).
32

V. Democratizing States and the War on Terror
A. Overview:
The fourth and final moment on the path of this thesis' study of the interactions between
humanitarianism and sovereignty brings us to the growing trend in state practice of
undergoing military interventions justified in whole or in part by humanitarian (read moral)
imperatives and a self-assumed responsibility. The US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq
following the September 11 attacks come to mind as the primary examples. However, these
interventions are not exclusive to the United States, its allies, or the West. In fact, the world
stage of armed conflict has recently witnessed the involvement of new players such as
Turkey's involvement in Syria and Libya, and, arguably, the recent Russian offensive in
Ukraine.
Similar to the previous three moments discussed above, this form of militarized
intervention did not come about in a vacuum. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of
the Soviet Union brought with them a period in which western doctrines and ideals
proliferated the fields of politics and international relations. The democratic peace theory and
the rapid globalization and liberalization of the world economy brought the fields of human
rights and development together as tools of institution or nation building. Afterall, the United
Nations had equated underdevelopment to a threat to international peace and security as was
the case with Kosovo. Inaction, such as was the case in Rwanda, was no longer an acceptable
scenario, and the September 11 attacks only seemed to prove it. This has led to the
militarization of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect that came out of the debate on
humanitarian intervention, and in some cases to its use as a tool for regime change.
After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Western states were
well positioned to lead the charge in the human rights field using their moral and economic
powers. As a result, they used the human rights vocabulary in their foreign policy to name
and shame foreign states and governments in violation, an activity provided for in the
practices and reports of humanitarian NGOs. This, of course, was most apparent in the
NATO intervention in Kosovo, which went unopposed by the international community.
Emboldened by the experience of Kosovo, the West went on to engage in similar
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In highlighting the effects of these interventions on
human rights, Tanguy cites Michael Ignatieff as saying: "'Since the end of the Cold War,
human rights have become the dominant moral vocabulary in foreign affairs,' observes
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political and human rights analyst Michael Ignatieff, adding pertinently that 'the question
after Sept. 11 is whether the era of human rights has come and gone.'"97
Notions of humanitarian interventions and the responsibility to protect, born in the aftermath
of the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and Rwanda, as demonstrated in the above chapter
led to a trend of legitimizing, advocating for, and supporting the use of force and intervention
in the domestic affairs of sovereign states in the guise of human rights. However, the world
and its politics after 11 September 2001 were no longer the same as the ones from before the
turn of the century. The attacks on the World Trade Center jarred the liberal school from its
drunken stupor after celebrating the long-held thesis of the end of history with the end of the
Cold War. The sobering reality that non-state actors can now cause cross border devastation
and threaten the security of the Western states brought back the long-forgotten reality of
power relations in the state of nature. It was no longer the Eastern Block, or the non-liberal
state, or rogue state that posed the threat. Terror was seen as the new reality in a state of war
of everyone against everyone. Knowing that a bold and blatant claim of a legitimate and legal
use of force in retaliation would not stand the scrutiny of international law, the United States
and its allies utilized the vocabulary of humanitarianism, human rights, democratization, and
international peace and security to legitimate their invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq
in 2003.
B. Military Humanitarianism
In the wake of September 11, The UNSC passed a resolution condemning the attacks on the
United States, calling them terrorist and describing them as a threat to international peace and
security. In its third paragraph, the resolution called on states to "work together urgently to
bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses
that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and
sponsors of these acts will be held accountable."98 The wording of the previous paragraph
was not unique to the resolution. In fact, it was an echo of United State's position, made
clearest in the famous presidential speech that divided the community of states into two
groups: supporters and enemies. In his speech, US President George W. Bush's said
Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not
expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic
strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of
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funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no
rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. […] From
this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the
United States as a hostile regime.99

Armed with the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the
[UN] Charter," and backed by the wording of the third paragraph, the United States then
communicated its demands to the Taliban without providing proof of Osama Bin Laden's
involvement in the September 11 attacks;100
Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of Al Qaida who hide in your land. Release all
foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign
journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist and every person in their support
structure to appropriate authorities. Give the United States fill access to terrorist training camps, so we
can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion.
The Taliban must act and act immediately, They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their
fate.101

This was the initial position that the United States pursued at the outset of its military
operations in Afghanistan in 2001. However, in November 2001, while addressing the United
Nations, President Bush's speech describing the Taliban regime and Al Qaida said
They promote terror abroad and impose a reign of terror on the Afghan people. Women are executed in
Kabal's [sic] soccer stadium. They can be beaten for wearing socks that are too thin. Men are jailed for
missing prayer meetings. The United States, supported by many nations, is bringing justice to the
terrorists in Afghanistan.102

However, this represented a marked change from the initial rhetoric. It painted the military
operations in Afghanistan not as ones of legitimate self-defense but as humanitarian missions
to liberate a population from their oppressive regime. In a state of the union address,
President Bush went on to outline the characteristics of the US policy in Afghanistan and to
respond to accusations of imperialism. He said
We have no intention of imposing out culture. But America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for
women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. America will take the side
of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world,
because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just
and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.
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Hence, justifying its invasion of Afghanistan, and later Iraq, the United States
presented its military interventions "as bringing ‘rights’ to those who did not have them in the
form of humanitarian relief as well."103 As a result, the US military and the militaries of its
allies were not the only actors in this campaign. Humanitarian NGOs, now more aligned with
Western government and policies, played an important role in it, and the US did not spare
them. While addressing such NGOs, US Secretary of State Colin Powell was quoted as
saying
More than ever, governments and intergovernmental organizations must work in partnership with
NGOs if compelling problems are to be effectively addressed. As I speak, just as surely as our
diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of
freedom. You are providing food and shelter to refugees and to the internally displaced, helping to
build vibrant civil societies and creating the conditions for sustainable development, sustainable
growth. […] And I want you to know that I have made it clear to my staff here and to all of our
ambassadors around the world that I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with
the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.104

It is this intermarriage of foreign policy, framed within a narrative of humanitarianism;
humanitarian NGO efforts to hold states and governments accountable for human rights
violations; and the doctrine of the war on terror that have allowed for undermining the
principles pertaining to state sovereignty to a point beyond recognition.
Today, some 20 years after the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Taliban has
taken over the country again; the United States and its allies overtly toppled and replaced a
regime in Iraq; and the War on Terror discourse found another home for itself in Syria, Libya,
and Yemen at the expense of millions of civilians who have either been killed, injured, or
displaced. Similarly, relying on a rhetoric of a responsibility to protect and an imperative to
liberate peoples from their oppressors, on 24 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir
Putin announed launching a military operation to protect Donbas and to combat
"Nazification" in Ukraine. Parallels in rhetoric can be drawn between that of the United
States vis-à-vis the invasion of Afghanistan and that of Russia vis-à-vis the military
intervention in Ukraine. The meeting minutes of the 8974th meeting of the UNSC, cite
Vassily Nebenzia of the Russian Federation as claiming that
Ukraine, actively armed by a host of States, is still harbouring a delusion that it can achieve a military
solution in Donbas with help from Western sponsors. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the significant
intensification of shelling and acts of diversion on the territory of the two republics. The OSCE
Special Monitoring Mission recorded almost 2,000 violations of the ceasefire regime, including nearly
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1,500 explosions. Donetsk and Luhansk residents remain sheltering in basements and refugees
continue to flow into the Russian Federation. The nature of provocations by Ukraine’s armed forces
has not changed.105

He goes on to explain that
“the tragedy of Ukraine” started after the illegitimate coup in 2014, when the new Government, instead
of engaging in dialogue with the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, brought guns and planes upon
them. The Russian leadership decided to recognize the republics to ensure peace and security. For
Western countries, the people in Donbas are only pawns in a geopolitical game aimed at weakening the
Russian Federation. “For us, these are women, children, the elderly who have been hiding from
Ukrainian shelling and provocations for eight years,” he said. The root of the current crisis lies in the
actions of Ukraine itself, which sabotaged its obligations under the Minsk Package of Measures. Last
week, there was hope that Kyiv would rethink and carry out what it agreed to in 2015. But Ukraine
was not ready for dialogue with the two republics or for steps to grant Donbas the special status
provided for by the Minsk agreements. Instead, Ukrainian provocations against Donbas intensified,
and the leaders of the two republics turned to Moscow with a request for military support, in
accordance with bilateral cooperation agreements concluded simultaneously with their recognition. He
described this as a logical step — as well as a consequence of actions taken by Ukraine’s regime.
During the current meeting, President Putin announced a special military operation in Donbas. Details
are yet to come, but the aim is to free people in that area from genocide conducted by Ukraine.

A brief survey of military interventions since the end of the Cold War, especially after
the September 11 attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan, demonstrates that sovereign
equality and freedom from intervention as principles of international law have been made to
cede to national interests presented partly or in whole under the guise of humanitarian
imperatives. The growing trend in state practice toward militarized humanitarian
interventions goes to suggest that a new era of international law is unfolding. Though
currently improbable it would not be impossible to imagine that given the appropriate
international environment, both politically and morally, a properly motivated court or
tribunal, such as in the Tadic case could pronounce that there exists sufficient state practice
and opinio juris reflected in the discourse of responsibility, humanity, and human rights to
constitute a new rule of customary international law. Such a pronouncement, unlikely as it
may seem today, would return the global order to the days prior to the formation of the
United Nations where might dictates the law and laws build empire.106
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VI. Conclusion
For centuries after the Treaty of Westphalia, state sovereignty reigned supreme among the
principles of international law, and sovereign states were free from the interventions of others
in their domestic affairs. However, the current international landscape, which was shaped in
part by the interaction between humanitarianism, international law, and state sovereignty,
reveals that the Westphalian model is no more.
The incremental and complementary changes that were brought on by discourses of
civility and humanity slowly chipped away at the borders of what was permitted. Private
actors working together with their governments or governments that aligned with their
principles and ethics created a space in which interventions can be justified. Consequently,
these changes set the stage for the creation of doctrines and legal regimes and frameworks
that redefined the meaning of sovereignty over time.
As demonstrated in the chapters above, the seemingly innocent genesis event of the
founding of the ICRC laid the foundation for the creation of systems of compliance on
humanitarian bases and of non-governmental humanitarian institutions. Building on that
infrastructure, the human rights movement expanded the scope of humanitarian concerns,
eventually elevating them to the level of international peace and security. In turn, this new
status catalyzed the creation of new regimes that drove humanitarian action down the road to
militarization and allowed for the physical and military intervention in the domestic affairs of
sovereign states on moral, if illegal, grounds. In other words, with militarized humanitarian
action now imaginable and possible, when legal regimes and mechanisms fail to guarantee
compliance, the offending state, its sovereignty now redefined, is brought to compliance by
force, further prolonging the conflict and victims' suffering. What started as an intervention to
reduce and/or put an end to human suffering caused by armed conflict has had the reverse
effect. Today, many states find themselves in the unforgiving grip of armed conflict, and
millions of civilians in the Global South find themselves dealing with death, injury,
starvation, displacement, and no access to basic needs as a result.
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